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I. Introduction
Every reader of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty confronts the difficulty 
of explaining how its various arguments fit into a coherent whole. 
Consider the puzzle that its main defense of freedom of discussion in 
Chapter 2 does not rely on the famous liberty principle introduced in 
Chapter 1, even though Mill calls that principle the “object” of his essay.1 
The liberty principle asserts that society’s consideration of coercive 
interference with rational adults is legitimate only when there is a risk of 
nonconsensual “harm to others” and never on paternalistic grounds.2 But 
Mill then defends freedom of discussion not by claiming that it involves no 
nonconsensual harm to others, but rather by claiming that the harm it 
might cause is more than compensated by the good it produces. His main 
defense of free discussion is like his defense of free trade: discussion and 
trade are both social conduct that society may interfere with in principle, 
but on balance it would not be beneficial to do so.3 Mill observes that 
“sectarianism,” which he regards as a major contributor to social harm, is 
“often heightened and exacerbated” by free discussion.4 But he then argues 
that the benefits of maintaining free discussion outweigh its costs because 
it offers the opportunity to exchange falsehood for truth, or partial truth for 
better adapted partial truth, and to keep our beliefs from becoming “dead 
dogma.” Mill’s defense of free discussion does not turn essentially on the 
application of the liberty principle, but on general utilitarian reasons. 
Consider also the interpretive troubles arising from the familiar 
claim that Mill’s defense of “individuality” in Chapter 3 provides his 
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rationale for the liberty principle. In his Autobiography he writes that On 
Liberty is “a kind of philosophic text-book of a single truth,” namely, 
“[…] the importance, to man and society, of a large variety in types of 
character, and of giving full freedom to human nature to expand itself in 
innumerable and conflicting directions.”5 A great deal of effort has 
therefore been dedicated to showing, on one hand, how this vision of 
flourishing individuality could justify an absolute anti-paternalism 
principle like the liberty principle and, on the other hand, how the liberty 
principle alone could secure Mill’s liberal vision, despite its rather 
narrow articulation in terms of the sorts of reasons that may trigger social 
interference. These attempts face two clear problems: first, that the value 
of individuality cannot alone justify an absolute principle within Mill’s 
utilitarian framework; second, that the liberty principle seems capable of 
securing Mill’s liberal vision alone only if “harm to others” is restricted 
in a way that he never specifies.6 The first of these problems—the 
absolutism problem—gives us strong reason to doubt that the value of 
individuality is meant to provide the full justification of the liberty 
principle, rather than just a defeasible presumption against social 
coercion. In fact, when Mill expressly develops the liberty principle in 
Chapter 4 of the essay, he provides a distinct, competence-based 
rationale for it that goes beyond the appeal to individuality: the 
competent individual, he argues, is always more likely than anyone else 
to be the best judge of his own good. The same presumption applies to 
individuals consensually engaged with each other. But if the value of 
individuality does not provide the specific rationale that makes the 
liberty principle absolute, then what exactly is its role in the overall 
argument of On Liberty? 
 In this essay I address the question of whether all that unites the 
main parts of On Liberty—the liberty principle, the defense of free 
discussion, the promotion of individuality, and the claims concerning 
competent decision-making—is a general concern with individual 
liberty, or whether we can say something more concrete about how they 
are related. I argue that the arguments of On Liberty form a structured 
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whole once we appreciate them through the lens of how Mill goes about 
designing political institutions in Considerations on Representative 
Government and related essays (including many that pre-date On 
Liberty).7 This will also help place On Liberty within his overall political 
philosophy. 
Properly understood, I argue, On Liberty is an instance of the 
institutional design approach that Mill applies to social and political 
arrangements. Demonstrating this requires first laying out the elements of 
Mill’s institutional design approach and then showing that On Liberty 
neatly applies them. 
I acknowledge that focusing on Mill’s institutional designs might 
seem like a non-starter. Political philosophers have tended to read 
Utilitarianism and On Liberty for Mill’s core theory, and Representative 
Government only for details of his practical democratic commitments, 
such as his support for proportional representation. On Liberty and 
Representative Government have therefore usually been related in only 
piecemeal fashion, though with allowances for their ultimate unification by 
the principle of utility.8 Moreover, when related more systematically—as 
potentially structured by a common approach or aims—commentators 
have worried that the élitist, competence-driven elements in Representative 
Government are inconsistent with his commitments to individuality and 
anti-paternalism in On Liberty.9 By contrast, I argue that Representative 
Government and On Liberty are not merely compatible, but expressions of 
the very same underlying approach. In the end, I hope to show that 
Mill applies his utilitarianism consistently across a range of texts, 
and thereby reveal what is relatively fixed and what is more easily given 
up in his liberal democratic theory. The first task, then, is to 
reconstruct his institutional design approach in Representative 
Government and related writings. 
Mill is a utilitarian, and so it bears mentioning that the ultimate 
standard of his designs is the “well-being of society” or the “aggregate 
interests of society.”10 However, we will focus on two more proximate 
aims that Mill believes should structure our institutional designs: 
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1. The educative aim: the improvement of the people 
themselves11 
2. The organizational aim: the organization of people’s 
extant good qualities to promote competent 
(informed, public-spirited) decision-making 
The basic idea is that the better the people themselves become, and the 
better the structures for giving effect to whatever virtue, intelligence, and 
energy they possess, the better will institutions promote and preserve 
social well-being. Mill makes clear that the educative aim is paramount: 
If we ask ourselves on what causes and conditions good 
government in all its senses, from the humblest to the 
most exalted, depends, we find that the principal of them, 
the one which transcends all others, is the qualities of the 
human beings composing the society over which the 
government is exercised.12 
To understand the structure and strength of Mill’s social and political 
commitments, then, we must keep track of how educative and 
organizational arguments, separately or together, result in the social and 
political institutions he recommends. Mill is willing to tinker a great deal 
with the organizational shape of liberal democracy, but he regards certain 
basic liberal and democratic institutions as essential to the educative aim in 
any modern, progressive society. 
 I will argue that On Liberty straightforwardly fits this pattern of 
institutional design. It offers, first and foremost, a defense of free discussion 
and “experiments of living” on broadly educative grounds. This is the 
overarching argument of On Liberty reflected both in the passage quoted 
from Mill’s Autobiography and in his important claims about the connection 
between liberty and progress.13 But On Liberty then also focuses our 
attention on a particular organizational principle—the liberty principle—that 
assigns rightful authority between society and the individual on the basis of 
the competence of the relevant parties. When it comes to self-regarding 
concerns involving no nonconsensual harm to others, the individual is likely 
the most competent party and should therefore decide the matter. 
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 Let me foreshadow two results. First, the institutional design 
approach to On Liberty can help to explain how Mill would update his 
views in light of later empirical work. For instance, although it is hard to 
imagine Mill ever relinquishing his deep commitment to social diversity 
(justified on educative grounds), we could more easily imagine him 
revising his strict anti-paternalism (justified primarily on organizational 
grounds) in light of modern cognitive psychology and behavioral 
economics. Changing his view on the latter does not imply any change in 
view on the former. 
 Second, the design approach resolves certain apparent inconsistencies 
in Mill’s works. For instance, it shows that his justification of the liberty 
principle is actually of a piece with his justification of élitist decision-
making mechanisms in Representative Government. In both cases, he 
argues that decisional authority with respect to some matter ought to be 
given to whichever party is most competent to make the relevant utilitarian 
calculation. The liberty principle and Mill’s élitism come from the same 
organizational place in his thought. 
 But it is time to circle back and try to make good on these claims. 
My discussion will proceed as follows. In Section II, I reconstruct in 
detail Mill’s design approach in Representative Government and related 
works, structured by educative and organizational considerations. In 
Section III, I then argue that On Liberty is structured by those same 
considerations and in the same way, which allows us to see both how the 
parts of that essay fit together and how that essay fits with the rest of his 
political philosophy. 
 
II. Mill’s Institutional Design Approach14 
“Form of Government” and “Centralization” 
 The first thing to appreciate about Mill’s designs, not normally 
noted, is that they have two distinct objects: (1) a “form of government” 
and (2) a scheme of “centralization.”15 The “form of government” 
concerns primarily the question of sovereignty—that is, who is to have 
“ultimate control” over government—and it is answered by choosing 
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from among versions of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.16 
“Centralization” then concerns the form and extent of principled 
constraints that should be placed on the sovereign’s rightful authority in 
a particular state of society, that is, “the limits which separate the 
province of government from that of individual and spontaneous agency, 
and of central from local government.”17 Fundamentally, centralization 
concerns the degree to which despotism by the sovereign is allowable or 
ought to be limited by liberty-preserving principles and safeguards.18 
Although the form of government and scheme of centralization are 
conceptually independent elements in a given state of society, Mill seems 
to conclude that states of society in which democracy is justified are also 
those in which extensive protections for individual liberty would be most 
beneficial.19 
 A third concern is not strictly part of Mill’s institutional designs, 
namely, the specific policies a well-functioning government ought to 
pursue once the form of government and scheme of centralization have 
been specified. Mill has a great deal to say about these policies, and many 
of the considerations he raises about forms of government and 
centralization also bear on his discussion of the good or harm of different 
policies. But specifying a form of government and a scheme of 
centralization does not obviate the need for decision-making or judgment 
on a host of practical problems. We should not think that every specific 
policy proposal must be reflected in the very structure of his institutional 
designs; sometimes they are just his recommendations to the appropriate 
social or political authority about what to do. This will be important for our 
understanding of the liberty principle as a design component, because 
some interpreters have asked that principle to do more work than Mill 
intended it to do. What Mill hopes to achieve by settling the form of 
government and scheme of centralization is simply to assure us that 
whatever decisions are made, they will be the result of decision-making 
structures that reflect his educative and organizational aims. Let us turn to 
those now. 
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Progress and the “twofold division of merit” 
 As noted, Mill’s basic commitment is to the principle of utility, but he 
accepts the practical need to identify proximate aims to guide the design of 
forms of government and schemes of centralization.20 His first move in 
Representative Government is to observe that “conduciveness to progress 
[…] includes the whole excellence of a government.”21 Given the 
difficulty of comprehending what the principle of utility will require in the 
long-term, progress serves as Mill’s principal end-in-view throughout his 
career. In his Autobiography he summarizes the development of his 
political thought in the early 1830s this way: 
 I now looked on the choice of political institutions as a 
moral and educational question […] and thought it should 
be decided mainly by considering what great improvement 
in life and culture stood next in order for the people 
concerned, as the condition of their further progress, and 
what institutions were most likely to promote that […].22 
 In concrete terms, progress means the education of individual 
character and the furnishing of those outward goods—such as security—
that facilitate improvements in individual and social well-being in a given 
state of society.23 However, in Representative Government, Mill also 
observes that the term “progress” is “unapt” for his design purposes 
because the same factors that promote progress are needed to preserve 
society against relapse, even “were there no improvement to be hoped 
for.”24 He therefore introduces the two proximate aims—the educative and 
organizational aims—that define the “twofold division of the merit that 
any set of political institutions can possess:” 
It consists partly of the degree in which they promote the 
general mental advancement of the community, including 
under that phrase advancement in intellect, in virtue, and 
in practical activity and efficiency; and partly of the 
degree of perfection with which they organize the moral, 
intellectual, and active worth already existing, so as to 
operate with the greatest effect on public affairs.25 
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 As noted above, the educative element of this division of merit comes 
first: “the most important point of excellence which any form of 
government can possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the 
people themselves.”26 Political institutions are an “agency of national 
education” not just through schools, but in the whole way they shape the 
motivations, character, beliefs, hopes, and expectations of those living 
under them.27 The educative element of a government is therefore “the one 
indispensable merit […] in favour of which it may be forgiven almost any 
amount of other demerit compatible with progress.”28 
 However, because even virtuous and intelligent individuals will have 
difficulty promoting the good when situated within decision-making 
structures that do not put their good qualities to effective use, the second 
division of merit is the organizational element, i.e., “the quality of the 
machinery itself; that is, the degree in which it is adapted to take advantage 
of the amount of good qualities” existing at any given time.29 In the 
organizational element, Mill directly carries forward Jeremy Bentham’s 
concern with securing “appropriate official aptitude”—what we might now 
call competence—in government.30 For Bentham, appropriate official 
aptitude has three components: moral aptitude, intellectual aptitude, and 
active aptitude. Generally speaking, moral aptitude concerns one’s public-
spiritedness or disposition to promote the overall good. Intellectual 
aptitude concerns one’s expertise and ability to weigh information related 
to some matter. Active aptitude concerns one’s capacity to put one’s 
commitments into action. Following Bentham, Mill spends a great deal of 
time developing structures to secure the public spirit and expertise of those 
making the decisions at all levels, and then allocating decisional authority 
in each domain to whichever available party is most competent to make 
decisions. Mill’s defense of representative democracy is perhaps the main 
example of his organizational thought.31 
 We will further explore Mill’s “twofold division of merit” as we go. 
But four clarifications will help. First, Mill acknowledges that it is slightly 
misleading to suggest a sharp distinction between government as “a great 
influence acting on the human mind, and a set of organized arrangements 
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for public business.”32 He recognizes that good organization itself tends to 
promote improvement in the people’s “state of cultivation.”33 Similarly, 
the effect of bad organization “is felt in a thousand ways in lowering the 
morality and deadening the intelligence and activity of the people.”34 On 
the flip side, the educative aim itself has implications for the “machinery” 
or structure of the institutions. To manage affairs well now is in part to 
make room for the mechanisms of individual development that drive social 
progress. 
 Second, Mill recognizes that our judgments about progress are 
epistemically limited. While some steps society must take are 
discernible, there is also “the far wider indefinite range which is at 
present out of sight.”35 This is not to say that Mill eschews all ideal 
theory or long-term thinking.36 But he concentrates, at any given time, on 
“the immediate impediment to progress.”37 Moreover, his educative 
arguments primarily involve general recommendations rather than 
specific measures, and they draw on what experience has taught us will 
consistently contribute to individual and social development over the 
long-term—such as free discussion in “civilized” society—rather than 
more temporary measures.38 Accepting these limits makes the educative 
element of his designs more tractable. 
 Third, as we shall see, sometimes educative and organizational 
arguments support the same institutional designs. While educative 
arguments are more important, and certain institutions seem to be 
defended primarily in either educative or organizational terms, these 
arguments often converge. This is especially significant in those cases 
where we might doubt the educative or organizational case; denying one 
argument need not undermine the other. 
 Finally, Mill recommends different forms of government and 
schemes of centralization for different states of society. For example, in an 
“uncivilized” state of society—a state in which a critical mass of the 
population has not sufficiently developed their spontaneous cooperative 
capacities39—he argues along Hobbesian lines for monarchy (form of 
government) and despotism (scheme of centralization):40 
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The indispensable virtue, therefore, in a government which 
establishes itself over a people of this sort is, that it make 
itself obeyed. To enable it to do this, the constitution of the 
government must be nearly, or quite, despotic […]. 
Accordingly, the civilization of such tribes […] is almost 
always the work of an absolute ruler, deriving his power 
either from religion or military prowess.41 
 But as societies develop, so do Mill’s educative recommendations. At 
first any despot will do, but at some point it becomes clear that, without a 
change in the form of government and scheme of centralization, further 
improvement will be held hostage to the “happy accident” of a good despot 
willing not to abuse his power.42 Moreover, as society becomes civilized, 
individuals develop cooperative tendencies and fellow-feeling, and threats 
from a despot are no longer needed to motivate cooperation.43 Further 
development is then better served by the people themselves taking over 
ultimate control in some form of democracy and starting on the path of 
“spontaneous improvement” that places limits on sovereign power in favor 
of “mental liberty and individuality.”44 
 With those preliminaries out of the way, let us now look at the 
educative arguments Mill gives for the form of government and degree of 
centralization appropriate to a modern, “civilized” state of society. 
 
The Educative Argument for Democracy 
 In civilized circumstances, Mill argues that the “superiority of popular 
government”—democracy, as the form of government—is “indisputable.”45 
This is because democratic participation itself directly contributes to individuals’ 
moral, intellectual, and active development. Democracy is a “school of public 
spirit.”46 Through public discussion, voting, serving on juries, holding local 
offices, and other public involvement, individuals become educated on public 
affairs and develop a concern for the social good.47 Monarchy and aristocracy 
offer no such similar opportunities or responsibilities for the great majority of 
citizens. Within important competing demands on their time, individuals should 
be encouraged to participate in the representative system.48 
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Educative Arguments for Liberty 
 Turning to the scheme of centralization appropriate to a civilized 
state of society, Mill makes perhaps his most famous argument, an 
educative case for significant limits on the exercise of sovereign 
authority. As we shall see later, this argument is at the heart of On 
Liberty, but it is on display already in other texts. For instance, in his 
1854 diary, we find Mill denying the sovereign the authority to limit 
public discussion because it is crucial to individual and social 
development: 
In government, perfect freedom of discussion in all its 
modes—speaking, writing, and printing—in law and in 
fact is the first requisite of good because [it is] the first 
condition of popular intelligence and mental progress. All 
else is secondary. A form of government is good chiefly 
in proportion to the security it affords for the possession 
of this.49 
Combining the educative case for democracy and freedom of discussion in 
Representative Government, Mill supports “the utmost possible publicity 
and liberty of discussion, whereby not merely a few individuals in 
succession, but the whole public, are made, to a certain extent, participants 
in the government, and sharers in the instruction and mental exercise 
derivable from it.”50 
 Mill then extends this educative argument from free discussion to 
modes of living, supporting openness and social experimentation. In 
language that prefigures famous passages from On Liberty, he argues in 
Principles of Political Economy that because of the tendency of even 
democratic governments to impose a uniformity on their citizens, there is 
a “necessity for surrounding individual independence of thought, speech, 
and conduct, with the most powerful defences, in order to maintain that 
originality of mind and individuality of character, which are the only 
source of any real progress, and of most of the qualities which make the 
human race much superior to any herd of animals.”51 Progress requires 
liberal social conditions allowing for: 
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[…] that multiform development of human nature, those 
manifold unlikenesses, that diversity of tastes and talents, 
and variety of intellectual points of view, which not only 
form a great part of the interest of human life, but by 
bringing intellects into stimulating collision, and by 
presenting to each innumerable notions that he would not 
have conceived of himself, are the mainspring of mental 
and moral progression.52 
On educative grounds, then, Mill commits himself fully to liberal freedoms 
of thought and discussion, freedom of association, and social diversity. 
They play a large role in justifying a presumption against social 
interference—a general, but defeasible “non-interference” principle—
according to which “the onus of making out a case always lies on the 
defenders of legal prohibitions.”53 
 There is more one might add to this story, but this is enough to show 
the overarching educative framing of Mill’s institutional design approach 
with regard to both the form of government and degree of centralization. 
The convictions expressed in these arguments for democracy and liberal 
social conditions are fixed points in Mill’s political philosophy. 
 
Organizational Arguments 
 Educative arguments leave open many questions about how to 
administer public affairs in a given time and place. Consider, for instance, 
the variety of liberal democracies in the world today, none obviously 
satisfying the educative element any better than the others. How do we 
decide among them? In Representative Government and related essays, 
Mill introduces a framework for thinking about how to organize the good 
qualities available in a particular society to best manage its public affairs. 
 What is most striking about Mill’s organizational thinking is his 
attention to jurisdictional matters, that is, to the question of who should 
decide what. Judgment is unavoidable and uncertain—like Bentham, Mill 
saw the limits of the felicific calculus—and so his practical utilitarianism 
focuses on the qualities of the personnel at hand to make decisions. 
Piers Norris Turner, “The Argument of Mill’s On Liberty” 
133 
Following Bentham, he explores what is required institutionally to give 
voice to the relative virtue, intelligence, and energy—the relative 
competence—of available parties: “All government which aims at being 
good, is an organization of some part of the good qualities existing in the 
individual members of the community, for the conduct of its collective 
affairs.”54 Wherever possible—and consistent with the basic liberal 
democratic framework justified on educative grounds—he introduces 
organizational specifications grounded in competence considerations, 
namely, orientation to the public good and expertise with regard to the 
relevant subject matter. Failures of either orientation or expertise would 
lead to poor decision-making.55 
 
Organizational Arguments for Democracy 
 Let us look first at his organizational argument with regard to the 
appropriate form of government in a civilized state of society, democracy. 
The main organizational argument for democracy is based not on 
expertise, but on orientation to the public good. Whatever the public’s 
deficiencies in expertise concerning details of policy, and despite the 
dangers of a tyranny of the majority, a democratically-controlled 
government is more likely than either monarchy or aristocracy to be 
responsive to the public good over time: “The interest of the monarch, or 
the interest of the aristocracy, either collective or that of its individual 
members, is promoted, or they themselves think that it will be promoted, 
by conduct opposed to that which the general interest of the community 
requires.”56 The people should not govern in an everyday sense, but they 
must retain the authority to turn out their rulers as “security for good 
government:” 
This security they cannot have by any other means than 
by retaining in their own hands the ultimate control. If 
they renounce this, they give themselves up to tyranny. A 
governing class not accountable to the people are sure, in 
the main, to sacrifice the people to the pursuit of separate 
interests and inclinations of their own.57 
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 Like Bentham and his father, James Mill, he emphasizes the 
importance of placing a popular check on government in order to maintain 
an “identity of interest” between rulers and the ruled: “From the principle 
of the necessity of identifying the interest of the government with that of 
the people, most of the practical maxims of a representative government 
are corollaries.”58 After a certain point, identity of interest may be balanced 
against other values, but security for good government is essential. And for 
this, the people must exercise “ultimate control” over government; they 
must be sovereign. 
 Within a broadly democratic framework, however, Mill also argues 
that certain individuals should have greater influence than others due to 
their superior competence. This is a constant feature of Mill’s political 
writings over time, reflected in every aspect of his political designs from 
the electoral system to the representative assembly to legislative 
commissions. To bring home the significance of competence 
considerations in the organizational element, it is worth surveying several 
examples of Mill’s organizational proposals. 
 Representative democracy, Mill argues, is government by the 
“comparatively few, specially educated for the task.”59 Representation 
gives voice to competence within the democratic framework: 
A representative constitution is a means of bringing the 
general standard of intelligence and honesty existing in 
the community, and the individual intellect and virtue of 
its wisest members, more directly to bear upon the 
government, and investing them with greater influence in 
it, than they would in general have under any other mode 
of organization.60 
 Yet, competence considerations also limit the representative 
assembly’s decision-making authority in two key ways. First, Mill argues 
that the assembly should not usurp the everyday governing authority of the 
executive branch, because the latter is better trained for that task: “Instead 
of the function of governing, for which it is radically unfit, the proper 
office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the 
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government.”61 Emphasizing the jurisdictional—who should decide 
what—nature of his approach, Mill argues that “The proper duty of a 
representative government in regard to matters of administration, is not to 
decide them by its own vote, but to take care that the persons who have to 
decide them shall be the proper persons.”62 Second, competence 
considerations constrain the assembly’s role with respect to the legislative 
function of government. He writes in his Autobiography of the “[…] need 
of a Legislative Commission, as a permanent part of the constitution of a 
free country; consisting of a small number of highly trained political 
minds, on whom, when Parliament has determined that a law shall be 
made, the task of making it should be devolved.”63 The picture that 
emerges is one of a nested set of decision-making domains, in which 
decision-making authority is allocated to whichever party is best suited to 
make those decisions. The assembly, the executive, and the legislative 
commission each have a role to play, consistent with a fundamental 
democratic check on power. 
 If we move back to the electoral level, we find that Mill’s views on 
“pledges,” plural voting, and proportional representation are also shaped 
by competence considerations. Let’s take them quickly in turn. 
 In his discussion of pledges—of whether democratic voters should 
secure promises from their representatives to govern in particular ways—Mill 
argues that it would be irrational to demand guarantees from representatives 
who were elected for their superior political virtue and expertise: 
Now, all we contend for, all we have ever contended for, 
is, that the people ought to have the benefit of having their 
affairs managed by the wise, rather than by those who are 
otherwise […] there may be a wiser government in the 
moon, perhaps, than the government of the wisest persons 
that can be had, but how, in the name of reason, is it to be 
got at? Shall we mend the matter by setting a less wisdom 
to dictate to a greater?64 
 He also proposes a plural voting scheme, detailed in “Thoughts on 
Parliamentary Reform” (1859), in which the educated and others who can 
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demonstrate their expertise should receive extra votes—though, for 
identity of interest reasons, not enough to overcome a majority opposing 
them. He does so expressly on competence grounds: “Now, it can in no 
sort be admitted that all persons have an equal claim to power over others. 
The claims of different people to such power differ as much, as their 
qualifications for exercising it beneficially.”65 To grant equal votes to 
people with unequal qualifications is “reversing all the rules of rational 
conduct.”66 In Representative Government he reiterates this point, arguing 
that “The opinion, the judgment, of the higher moral or intellectual being, 
is worth more than that of the inferior: and if the institutions of the country 
virtually assert that they are of the same value, they assert a thing which is 
not.”67 
 Mill’s defense of Thomas Hare’s proportional representation plan in 
“Recent Writers on Reform” (1859) also has an important competence 
element. He writes that it would “prodigiously improve the personnel of 
the national representation” because it would provide an opportunity for 
someone of great “personal merit” to draw votes from all over the country 
and have a chance against some “local grandee”: “An assembly thus 
chosen would contain the élite of the nation.”68 In all these examples of 
Mill’s organizational specification of a democratic form of government, 
competence appears as a key structuring element of his institutional 
designs. 
 They also bring to mind long-standing worries about Mill’s 
democratic credentials. But it is important to appreciate that, on his view, 
these specific competence-based proposals must be consistent with the 
people maintaining ultimate control, which is justified on both educative 
and more fundamental organizational grounds. What matters for our 
purposes is that Mill does not identify democracy with any simple 
majoritarian voting procedure, but with the basic notion that no 
“minority should be allowed to outweigh the majority.”69 These are not 
the same, because—as Mill repeatedly points out—simple majoritarian 
voting may result in a scenario where the bare majority of a public is 
able to elect the great majority or all of the representatives. If that 
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happens, it is then possible that a bare majority of the representatives, 
representing a minority of the overall public, could come to control the 
government—while other minority interests might have very little or no 
representation at all. This is the main reason that Mill calls proportional 
representation the “first principle of democracy:” “It is an essential part 
of democracy that minorities should be adequately represented. No real 
democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without 
it.”70 The representative assembly cannot effectively perform its job as a 
deliberative and controlling body—representing everyone’s interests—if 
significant minority interests do not have a voice within it.71 
 The basic democratic constraint on Mill’s organizational proposals 
is that, whatever reforms are made to increase the influence of certain 
groups (including the more competent), they must not undermine the rest 
of society’s capacity to assert itself (if needed) in defiance of any 
minority. He believes all of his organizational designs—even his scheme 
of plural voting—to be consistent with this conception of democracy. 
 
Organizational Arguments for Liberty 
 Moving from the form of government to the scheme of centralization, 
Mill suggests two main ways that organizational considerations should 
inform the latter in a civilized society. First, he argues for a principled limit 
on the sovereign’s right to interfere with local government in purely local 
matters. He writes, “It is obvious, to begin with, that all business purely 
local—all which concerns only a single locality—should devolve upon the 
local authorities […]. The nation at large is interested in them in no other 
way, than that in which it is interested in the private well-being of all its 
individual citizens.”72 Again, competence considerations justify this limit 
on the sovereign’s authority. While central authorities are more likely to 
have greater intellectual capacities and to know more about how to govern 
in general, Mill argues that their relative lack of knowledge of the details 
of local matters means that local bodies should decide them: “I need not 
dwell on the deficiencies of the central authority in detailed knowledge of 
local persons and things […].73 
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 Second, in Principles of Political Economy Mill argues on 
competence grounds for a principled limit on social interference with 
purely personal matters, concerning only oneself. This limit is not the 
general, defeasible presumption against interference justified earlier on 
educative grounds, but a further organizational principle based on 
competence considerations: 
there is a part of the life of every person who has come to 
years of discretion, within which the individuality of that 
person ought to reign uncontrolled either by any other 
individual or by the public collectively […]. I apprehend 
that it ought to include all that part which concerns only 
the life, whether inward or outward, of the individual, and 
does not affect the interests of others, or affects them only 
through the moral influence of example.74 
Now, a strict anti-paternalism principle like this might also gain support 
from educative considerations, but it is unlikely that they alone could 
ever justify more than a general non-interference principle. In his 
discussion of the anti-paternalism principle in Principles of Political 
Economy, Mill does not carefully distinguish educative from 
organizational considerations, but among the reasons he cites is 
competence: “people understand their own business and their own 
interests better, and care for them more, than the government does, or 
can be expected to do.”75 This claim would presumably be strongest with 
regard to purely personal matters, especially for any “person who has 
come to years of discretion.” Bearing in mind how competence 
considerations figure in the organizational recommendations canvassed 
above, it seems likely that they are also the key to Mill’s strict anti-
paternalism, over and above any educative considerations justifying a 
general non-interference principle. 
 What we have found, then, is that organizational considerations speak 
to both the form of government and degree of centralization, specifying a 
set of institutional arrangements consistent with the general liberal 
democratic commitments justified on educative grounds. And these 
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proposals all focus on giving decision-making authority on some matter to 
the most competent available party. 
 Before moving on to On Liberty, it is worth noting again that 
although Mill treats the need for a democratic check on power and liberal 
social conditions as hard-won historical truths, he often expresses a 
willingness to reconsider his specific organizational proposals. Proposals 
such as plural voting are less fundamental to his framework than, say, his 
commitment to free discussion. Mill never seriously entertains the thought 
that free discussion and social experimentation are not essential to a 
progressive modern society, but he does second-guess his plural voting 
proposal. 
 It is also important to see that, strictly speaking, all of the specific 
organizational proposals concern only delegated authority. They are Mill’s 
recommendations to the democratic sovereign for how and when (not) to 
assert its ultimate control over organizational issues themselves: “the 
powers which [a representative government] leaves in hands not directly 
accountable to the people, can only be considered as precautions which the 
ruling power is willing should be taken against its own errors.”76 Their 
authority may be delegated to localities and individuals where appropriate, 
and checked by complex governmental designs, but “This ultimate power 
they must possess in all its completeness. They must be masters, whenever 
they please, of all the operations of government.”77 
 The public may therefore rightfully assert its ultimate authority at any 
given time, but Mill argues that it would be irrational for it to do so, and 
therefore it should limit its own governing authority in principled ways or 
otherwise decide not to interfere even when it has not delegated its 
authority.78 Crucially, however, although the democratic sovereign may 
override proposed organizational limits, it may not undermine the 
conditions of free discussion and social experimentation justified on 
educative grounds.79 Those commitments are necessary for any reasonable 
expectation of improvement at all. 
 We now have a model of Mill’s institutional design approach that we 
can apply to On Liberty. On this model, Mill’s designs aim to specify a 
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form of government and scheme of centralization for a given state of 
society. They are structured by educative and organizational elements, 
with the educative coming first. Organizational proposals then specify a set 
of institutional arrangements meant to promote competent decision-
making, all consistent with his educative commitments. 
 
III: On Liberty in Design Context80 
 Finally, then, we are in position to take stock of On Liberty in light of 
Mill’s institutional design approach. I believe the purpose of On Liberty is 
to address educative and organizational aspects of a particular question 
about centralization, namely, the extent to which, in a civilized society, the 
individual should be free from social and political interference.81 At the 
beginning of the essay, Mill assumes that democracy is the appropriate 
form of government for civilized society—that is not his interest here—but 
he uses the historical rise of democracy to motivate a discussion 
concerning the limits of social or political authority. He argues that it is a 
mistake to believe, as some have, that settling the form of government in 
favor of democracy obviates the need to address centralization questions.82 
Because even democracy may result in a “collective despotism” of the 
majority, he argues that we must still address “the nature and limits of the 
power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the 
individual.”83 In what follows, I try to show that the argument of On 
Liberty exactly fits the institutional design approach with regard to 
centralization. If successful, we will have gone some way toward revealing 
a common mode of thought underlying Mill’s political works, and toward 
understanding how the arguments of On Liberty form a unified whole. 
 
The Educative Element in On Liberty 
 The central argument of On Liberty—contained principally in the 
chapters on free discussion and individuality—highlights liberty’s 
contribution to the educative social conditions appropriate to a civilized 
society. As we saw, Mill reports in his Autobiography that On Liberty is a 
“a kind of philosophic text-book of a single truth,” namely, “[…] the 
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importance, to man and society, of a large variety in types of character, and 
of giving full freedom to human nature to expand itself in innumerable and 
conflicting directions.”84 This recalls the earlier passage from Principles of 
Political Economy concerning the “multiform development of human 
nature,” where bringing different ideas into “stimulating collision” is “the 
mainspring of mental and moral progression.” In On Liberty, Mill 
similarly defends conditions of free discussion and “experiments in living” 
that allow for the free development of individuals by facilitating criticism, 
learning, and innovation.85 He reminds us of “[…] the source of everything 
respectable in man either as an intellectual or as a moral being, namely, 
that his errors are corrigible. He is capable of rectifying his mistakes, by 
discussion and experience […].”86 Discussion and experience not only 
provide a check on collective despotism, but in civilized circumstances are 
the main drivers of individual and social development. 
 In line with his comments in other works, Mill argues in Chapter 2 of 
On Liberty that discussion should be utterly unrestricted. He argues that 
whether received opinion is possibly false or certainly true, discussion is so 
valuable for individual and social improvement that the harms of 
restricting discussion always outweigh the benefits.87 His extended defense 
reinforces the claim that free discussion is the key educative commitment 
with regard to the degree of centralization appropriate to civilized society. 
Any form of government must respect that constraint on its authority. This 
is why he argues that restrictions on free discussion by social authority are 
not just wrongheaded within its appropriate limits, but actually transgresses 
those limits: “I deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion, 
either by themselves or by their government. The power itself is 
illegitimate. The best government has no more title to it than the worst.”88 
 Beyond free discussion, Mill argues that the educative conditions of 
“discussion and experience” require an unspecified (but sufficient) 
degree of liberty for individuals to pursue different “modes of life.”89 
This is the argument primarily of Chapter 3 of On Liberty, in which he 
expounds the importance of a general non-interference principle. 
Echoing Principles of Political Economy, he argues that where 
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individuals are subject to despotic or overbearing social or political 
forces, we find them “cramped” and “inert and torpid” or mere “sheep.”90 
Society will tend to “prevent the formation of any individuality not in 
harmony with its ways and compel all characters to fashion themselves 
upon the model of its own.”91 At the beginning of Chapter 3, he thus 
argues that the educative considerations justifying free discussion should 
also apply, with some qualifications, to modes of life.92 Individuality is 
“quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress.”93 The core 
of On Liberty is his argument that, in civilized circumstances, individual 
liberty is vital to that development: 
The spirit of improvement is not always a spirit of 
liberty, for it may aim at forcing improvements on an 
unwilling people: and the spirit of liberty, in so far as it 
resists such attempts, may ally itself locally and 
temporarily with the opponents of improvement: but the 
only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is 
liberty, since by it there are as many possible 
independent centres of improvement as there are 
individuals.94 
The central argument of On Liberty is an educative argument for 
individual liberty. When Mill refers early on to “utility in the largest 
sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive 
being,95 he invokes his commitment to the educative conditions of 
“discussion and experience” that place limits on the scope of social 
authority. 
 In and of itself, this might not surprise Mill scholars, but by setting 
his argument in design context we are able not only to see connections 
with his other political works, but to get leverage on the interpretive 
problems mentioned at the outset. In particular, as I will now argue, the 
focus on Mill’s institutional designs helps to explain how he justifies the 
liberty principle if not by appeal to the educative arguments just 
rehearsed, and shows that the arguments of On Liberty are a consistent 
part of Mill’s approach. 
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The Liberty Principle as an Organizational Proposal 
 Within the liberal educative conditions appropriate to civilized 
society, Mill turns in On Liberty to a single organizational proposal, the 
liberty principle, which he asserts is the “object” of his essay: 
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will is to prevent harm to others […]. The only 
part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable 
to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which 
merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, 
absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the 
individual is sovereign.96 
For our purposes, what matters is that the liberty principle prohibits 
absolutely any paternalistic social or political interference with the liberty 
of rational adults.97 It denies that social authority may rightfully consider 
interference on the basis of the individual’s own good. Attending to Mill’s 
institutional design approach reveals that the liberty principle is specifically 
justified not on educative, but on organizational, grounds. 
 This interpretation of the liberty principle draws strong support from 
the opening paragraphs of Chapter 4 of On Liberty, which provide Mill’s 
fullest discussion of the nature and rationale of the liberty principle. He 
there restates it in a way that highlights the organizational emphasis on 
jurisdiction: 
As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects 
prejudicially the interests of others, society has 
jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the 
general welfare will or will not be promoted by 
interfering with it, becomes open to discussion. But 
there is no room for entertaining any such question 
when a person's conduct affects the interests of no 
persons besides himself […]. In all such cases there 
should be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the 
action and stand the consequences.98 
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In other words, society may consider the practical question of how and 
whether to interfere only within its jurisdiction, and its jurisdiction does 
not extend to purely personal matters. In the following paragraph, he then 
presents a competence rationale for the liberty principle: 
But neither one person, nor any number of persons, is 
warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe 
years, that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit 
what he chooses to do with it […] with respect to his own 
feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man or 
woman has means of knowledge immeasurably 
surpassing those that can be possessed by any one else 
[…]. In this department, therefore, of human affairs, 
Individuality has its proper field of action.99 
 On Mill’s view, the epistemic standing of the rational adult with 
regard to his own good exceeds that of anyone else, in virtue of his 
familiarity with the complex particularities of “his own feelings and 
circumstances.” He also appeals to interest as a test of competence, 
arguing that the interest of the individual in his own good is a strong 
indication that he will be uniquely attentive to, and familiar with, the 
details of his situation.100 
 In keeping with other organizational proposals canvassed above, Mill 
argues that the specific justification of the absolute, anti-paternalistic 
liberty principle—distinct from the general educative arguments for 
individual liberty—is that ex ante the rational adult is always more likely 
than any other party to make the best decisions with regard to his own 
good. This is not to suggest that the individual is always correct about 
these matters. But it is to say that, on Mill’s view, the rational individual is 
always more competent with regard to his own good, and that it would 
always be practically irrational to substitute the decision of a less 
competent party for that of the individual.101 Consider how this resonates 
with Mill’s comments on “pledges” and plural voting. 
 The claim that the rational individual is always the most competent 
available judge of his own good is contentious, to say the least. 
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Nevertheless, I believe this interpretive claim is forced upon us by two 
further cases that exactly parallel the liberty principle case, in which Mill 
also justifies an absolute rule explicitly on competence grounds despite 
being generally skeptical of absolute rules. 
 The first case was mentioned above, concerning control over purely 
local matters by local authorities. As we saw, Mill argues that, without 
exception, “all business purely local […] should devolve upon the local 
authorities” rather than be decided by the central government. This limit 
on central authority is then explicitly justified by competence 
considerations regarding the “deficiencies of the central authority in 
detailed knowledge of local persons and things.” 
 The second case concerns the question of when, if ever, a civilized 
country may intervene in the purely domestic affairs of another civilized 
country.102 In a key passage from an 1865 letter to James Beal, in which 
Mill succinctly states his positions on a number of issues (to aid the 
consideration of him as a candidate for Parliament), he writes: 
Every civilised country is entitled to settle its internal 
affairs in its own [way], & no other country ought to 
interfere with its discretion, because one country, even 
with the best intentions, has no chance of properly 
understanding the internal affairs of another: but when 
this indefeasible liberty of an independent country has 
already been interfered with; when it is kept in subjection 
by a foreign power, either directly, or by assistance given 
to its native tyrants, I hold that any nation whatever may 
rightfully interfere to protect the country against this 
wrongful interference.103 
Note the structural parallels to the liberty principle case. Mill here argues 
that “civilized” states (in place of rational adults) should be understood 
to have control over their own good. As with the liberty principle, he 
argues that this right is indefeasible (except when a clearly discernible 
preference by a civilized people to determine its own affairs is already 
being thwarted by some external power). What is more, Mill’s claim here 
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is explicitly based on competence considerations concerning what an 
external power has a “chance of properly understanding” of another 
state’s internal affairs. 
 In both these parallel cases, then, Mill’s argument for an absolute 
principle is expressly grounded in a competence claim about the protected 
party’s greater knowledge concerning its own particular circumstances, 
mirroring the individual’s “means of knowledge” about his own 
circumstances. Given the similarities among these cases, we have strong 
reason to suspect that his justification of the liberty principle is meant to 
follow the same pattern. If this is right, then the liberty principle is also of 
a piece with the many competence-based elements of Mill’s theory of 
representative democracy, because they are all organizational proposals in 
Mill’s institutional designs. 
 The institutional design view shows that, in reading On Liberty it is 
especially important to keep its overarching, educative argument for 
individual liberty distinct from its narrower organizational argument for the 
liberty principle. Each of these elements—the defenses of free discussion 
and individuality, the liberty principle itself, and his competence-based 
rejection of paternalistic interference—represents an aspect of Mill’s 
consistent utilitarian approach to institutional designs. The institutional 
design view can straightforwardly explain the purpose of chapters 2 and 3 in 
the overall argument of On Liberty. The difficulty of how the liberty 
principle then relates to those chapters also vanishes once we clearly 
distinguish the educative arguments for free discussion and individuality 
from the specific organizational justification of the liberty principle. 
 The institutional design view also clarifies how Mill can argue for an 
absolute anti-paternalism principle. Seeing the liberty principle as an 
organizational proposal allows us to appreciate the significance of his 
competence-based justification of it in Chapter 4 of On Liberty. Taking a 
critical perspective, it also shows the limited effect on Mill’s overall 
defense of liberty if the organizational argument for an absolute principle 
were to fail. In light of modern psychology and behavioral economics, I 
believe Mill could accept that the competence argument for an absolute 
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principle fails without threatening his educative arguments at all. The 
liberty principle is just one part of Mill’s overall defense of individual 
liberty. By contrast, those who believe that the liberty principle is itself 
justified directly by Mill’s educative arguments have no good way either to 
explain the absoluteness of the liberty principle in the first place or to 
assess the damage to his overall defense of individual liberty if the liberty 
principle—as an absolute principle—cannot be sustained. 
 
IV: Conclusion 
 I have tried to show that the argument of On Liberty fits neatly into a 
properly reconstructed account of Mill’s institutional design approach. In 
that essay, he sets aside the question of the form of government, and 
focuses on the question of centralization in a civilized society. In endorsing 
limits on social authority, he first (in order of importance) commits to key 
educative conditions and then introduces and defends an important 
organizational principle on competence grounds. 
 Focusing on Mill’s institutional design approach also reveals a 
continuity in Mill’s political thought not fully recognized by 
commentators. Given that On Liberty and Representative Government 
were written nearly contemporaneously and they address related political 
subjects, we should expect them to share a similar underlying approach. 
This will challenge some people’s understanding of Mill’s liberalism in a 
fundamental way, for it shows that On Liberty carefully works out a set of 
liberty-related issues within a methodical utilitarian approach to social and 
political problems. However, if the attention to Mill’s institutional design 
approach is on the right track, then perhaps, by bearing in mind the 
structure of his designs, we can better address many of the other long-
standing difficulties that have so troubled interpreters of On Liberty.104 
 
Notes 
The abbreviation CW refers to John Stuart Mill, Collected Works of John 
Stuart Mill, 33 Volumes, ed. John M. Robson (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1963-1991) 
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Piers Norris Turner, “The Argument of Mill’s On Liberty” 
149 
citations refer to Considerations on Representative Government. 
 12 CW 19:389. 
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to any or all of the social or political authorities, and he applies the same 
educative and organizational considerations about centralization to them 
all. 
 82 CW 18:219. 
 83 CW 18:217. 
 84 CW 1:259. 
 85 CW 18:281. 
 86 CW 18:231-32. 
 87 It is not often noted that in Chapter 2 of On Liberty Mill focuses 
only on “discussion,” though he may also reject restrictions on other forms 
of speech. By “discussion” he means the sincere expression of moral and 
political opinion, regulated by concerns of fair play and truth. His ideal is 
captured in his description of the “real morality of public discussion” in 
On Liberty: “[…] giving merited honour to every one, whatever opinion he 
may hold, who has calmness to see and honesty to state what his 
opponents and their opinions really are, exaggerating nothing to their 
discredit, keeping nothing back which tells or can be supposed to tell, in 
their favour” (CW 18:259). See also “The French Law Against the Press” 
(1848), CW 25:1118. 
 88 CW 18:229. For a full account of Mill’s defense of free discussion, 
see Turner 2013a. 
 89 CW 18:270. 
 90 CW 18:242, 265, 270; see also 264, 310. 
 91 CW 18:220. 
 92 CW 18:260. 
 93 CW 18:261. 
 94 CW 18:272. The following passage from the very end of On 
Liberty also takes on heightened significance: “The worth of a State, in the 
long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it; and a State which 
postpones the interests of their mental expansion and elevation […] will 
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find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished” (CW 
18:310). 
 95 CW 18:224. 
 96 CW 18:223, 224. 
 97 Mill explicitly states that the principle does not apply to “Those 
who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others,” including 
children, those in “backward states of society” (CW 18:224), and those not 
in “full use of the reflecting faculty” (CW 18:294). 
 98 CW 18:276, emphasis added. 
 99 CW 18:277, emphasis added. 
 100 CW 18:277. 
 101 See Turner 2013b for a full discussion of Mill’s position on this 
point. His claim may strike us now as wrong, but I contend that it is his 
view. 
 102 This is not the place to address Mill’s views on international 
intervention or colonialism, but this passage speaks directly to Mill’s 
institutional design approach. For an excellent discussion of Mill’s 
approach to international relations, see Varouxakis 2013. 
 103 CW 16:1033, emphasis added. 
 104 This paper benefited from audiences at Bowling Green State 
University and San Francisco State University. For extensive comments on 
an earlier draft, I am grateful to Dale Miller. Thanks also to Sven-Ove 
Hansson for valuable feedback and for editing this special issue. 
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